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Petitioner Holly Rebecca Rosser [“Holly”], by and through counsel
and pursuant to Rule 24(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
hereby submits the following reply brief supporting her position set forth
in her Opening Brief1 and addressing the arguments raised in
Respondent Ronald Lee Rosser [“Ron”]’s Brief in Opposition.2

ARGUMENT
As Holly previously explained in her opening brief, there are two
independent grounds for reversing the Court of Appeals’ decision: first,
the Court of Appeals’ construction and application of Utah Code § 78B-6301(4) [“Subsection (4)”] is incorrect as a matter of law; and second, the
issue of the proper construction and application of Subsection (4) should
not have been decided, as it was never properly before the Court of
Appeals. Holly will discuss both of these grounds and Ron’s responses to
them in further detail infra. But before getting into those matters, Holly
notes that in the Introduction and Statement of the Case sections of his
Brief, Ron gives an account of the underlying material facts most
favorable to his position.3 However, as the issue before this Court is one of
law, the facts are to be viewed “in the light most favorable to the findings
of the trial court.”4 Thus, while parts of Ron’s statement of facts may not

1.

Hereinafter “Opening Br.” (filed Aug. 28, 2019).

2.

Hereinafter “Br. Opp.” (filed Oct. 28, 2019).

3.

Br. Opp. at 1–3, 6–10.

4.

See State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 476 (Utah 1990).
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represent the record accurately,5 Holly will not trouble the Court with an
issue that is of marginal relevance.

I.

THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE COURT OF APPEALS’ DECISION AND
HOLD THAT THE SCOPE OF CONTEMPTIBLE DECEIT UNDER SUBSECTION (4)
IS EQUIVALENT TO THAT OF THE DOCTRINE OF FRAUD ON THE COURT.
In Point I of her opening brief, Holly showed how the Court of

Appeals’ interpretation of Subsection (4) as only applying to deceit
communicated directly to a court is not supported by either the plain text
of the statute or by its context or purpose. Rather, these factors, as well as
the case law of other jurisdictions and scholarly authority, support an
interpretation that focuses not on who the deceit is communicated to, but
rather whether the deceit interfered with the administration of justice. In
response, Ron raises the following arguments against this conclusion:
(A) that the plain text of Subsection (4) supports the Court of Appeals’
interpretation; (B) that Ron’s deceitful conduct did not implicate the
authority of the court; (C) that Holly’s interpretation of Subsection (4)
raises due process concerns; and (D) that the district court’s findings are
not sufficient to find fraud on the court. Holly will address these
arguments in turn.
5.
For example, while Ron states that the parties’ tax preparer, Derrick
Clark, “assumed that [Holly] paid the amounts owed to the IRS by the April
tax filing deadline,” Br. Opp. at 8, this misrepresents his testimony. While
Mr. Clark testified that he assumed that the amounts were paid, he did not
testify as to who he believed had made the payments. R. at 1344–45 (Tr.
Evid. Hr’g, 78:24–79:15).
Spencer Law Office PLLC
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A. The Court of Appeals’ interpretation of Subsection (4) is not
supported by the statute’s plain text.
In his brief, Ron argues that Holly’s reading of Subsection (4)
renders inoperative or superfluous the phrase “in respect to a court or its
proceedings.”6 However, as explained in page 16 of Holly’s opening brief,
“in respect to” means “concerning, regarding, related to or in connection
with.” While Ron appears to conclude that this phrase means “within” or
“in the presence of,”7 he does not provide any authority to support that
conclusion. Ron’s deceiving Holly to stipulate to the entry of an order at
odds with the mediation agreement is plainly deceit “related to or in
connection with” the court proceeding, and Ron does not attempt to refute
that conclusion.
Ron also argues that Holly’s reading of Subsection (4) “requires
incorporating additional language to render it reasonable.”8 However, Ron
does not explain what additional language would have to be added. As
explained on page 16 of Holly’s opening brief, the language of Subsection
(4) does not include an object that the deceit must be directed toward.
Thus, no additional language is needed for the statute to cover a party’s

6.

Br. Opp. at 23.

7.
Br. Opp. at 16 (arguing that while Subsection (4) “applied only in
respect to a court or its proceedings,” Holly’s theory of contempt “relied
exclusively on facts occurring outside of the court or its proceedings”).
8.

Br. Opp. at 25.
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“out-of-court statement during an ongoing case”9 if that statement
otherwise meets the requirements for fraud or willful misrepresentation10
and is consistent with the purposes of the contempt power.11
B. Ron’s deceit implicates the authority of the court as it hindered
Holly from presenting her claims and defenses.
Next, Ron looks at the provisions neighboring Subsection (4) and
argues that “while various subsections of the statute include conduct that
could conceivably occur outside of the court’s immediate presence, those
provisions often either directly involve a judicial order or implicate the
‘authority of the court.’ ”12 Holly agrees with that statement—as stated in
her opening brief, a deceit is contemptible if it impedes the court’s
authority and its function of administering justice.13 However, as she also
explained, a deceit does not need to be directed at the court in order to
impede its authority and the administration of justice.14 This is why Utah
courts recognize as “fraud on the court” not just representations made to
the court, but also acts calculated to “unfairly hamper[] the presentation
of the opposing party’s claim or defense.”15 Despite Ron’s arguments to
9.

Br. Opp. at 25.

10.

Opening Br. at 16 (defining deceit).

11. See Opening Br. at 17 (explaining that a statute should be read in
light of its purpose); id. at 19 (defining contempt).
12.

Br. Opp. at 22.

13.

Opening Br. at 19.

14.

Opening Br. at 17–18.

15.

Opening Br. at 20–21.
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the contrary,16 Ron’s deceiving Holly to stipulate to the entry of an order
at odds with the mediation agreement is intentional act by a party that
prevents the opposing party from making a full defense and therefore
“implicates the authority of the court.” It is therefore contemptible deceit
under Subsection (4).
C. Adjudicating a fraud on the court through contempt procedures
does not raise due process concerns.
Ron next argues that it would be inappropriate to interpret
Subsection (4) as encompassing a willful misrepresentation made by a
party to someone other than the court because to do so would raise due
process concerns. The first due process concern he raises is lack of notice,
arguing that if Subsection (4) included a willful misrepresentation made
by a party to someone other than the court, a party would be able “to
initiate a civil or criminal contempt proceeding whenever an out-of-court
statement . . . bears some relationship to vague notions of the
administration of justice,” which would mean that “litigants would likely

16. Br. Opp. at 26 (arguing that Subsection (4) “was understood to be
directed towards protecting judicial authority, as opposed to private
interest”); id. at 31 (arguing that cases cited by Holly are distinguishable
because they “directly implicate the court’s authority”); id. at 35 (arguing
that fraud on the court “should be narrowly construed to embrace only that
type of fraud which defiles the court itself”); id. at 38 n.13 (“[I]t is difficult to
see how [the facts of this case] satisfy the demands of the fraud on the court
doctrine . . .”).
Spencer Law Office PLLC
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lack fair notice when their conduct may lead to criminal or civil
sanctions.”17
However, this argument fails for several reasons. First, “a statute is
not unconstitutionally vague if it is sufficiently explicit to inform the
ordinary reader what conduct is prohibited.”18 As explained on pages 15–
16 of her Opening Brief, the plain text of Subsection (4) prohibits a party
to

an

action

or

special

proceeding

from

willfully

deceiving

or

misrepresenting material facts in connection with that proceeding. Holly’s
interpretation is consistent with the plain text of the statute and so is not
unconstitutionally vague. Second, any vagueness in Subsection (4) would
arise not out of whether the deceit is directed at the court or another
party, but because of the extra-textual requirement that the deception
must “bear some relationship to vague notions of the administration of
justice,” as Ron puts it. However, this requirement is included in the very
nature of contempt proceedings—deceit, whether toward the court or
another party, is not contemptuous if the deceit does not “obstruct[] the
court in the administration of justice.”19 It is therefore difficult to see how

17.

Br. Opp. at 27–28.

18.

Orem City v. Bishop, 2012 UT App 15, ¶ 3, 269 P.3d 1007.

19. United States v. Talbot, 133 F. Supp. 120, 127–28 (D. Alaska Terr.
1955); see also 21 N.Y. Jur. 2d Contempt § 21 (Rev. ed. 2019) (noting that
“filing a false affidavit may constitute contempt,” but “false statements in
an affidavit do not constitute contempt where the statements are
immaterial to any questions in the case or where the rights or remedies of
the other party have not been defeated, impeded, or prejudiced”).
Spencer Law Office PLLC
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the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of Subsection (4) would not be subject
to the same concerns. Finally, as Ron was held in civil contempt,20 the
question of whether Subsection (4) would be unconstitutionally vague as
applied to criminal contempt is beyond the scope of this proceeding.21
Ron also argues that “the expedited nature of a contempt procedure
may prevent a party from obtaining the documents or discovery necessary
to defend against the allegations, especially if the specific theory of ‘deceit’
or factual allegations are unclear.”22 First, while it is true that the
application of Rules 26–36 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to
contempt proceedings is somewhat unclear, Rules 16(a) and 26(c)(6) allow
a party to obtain an order requiring the parties to make appropriate
disclosures in advance of the hearing and allowing further discovery upon
a showing of good cause. Second, as fraud must be alleged with
particularity under Rule 9(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and as
Utah Code § 78B-6-302(2) requires a statement of alleged facts to be
issued, a party alleged to be in contempt has a remedy for unclear
allegations of deceit. Finally, while Ron appears to complain about the
lack of disclosure and discovery in his own case, it does not appear that he
20.

R. at 1132–1135.

21. State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, ¶ 43, 99 P.3d 820 (“The constitution
tolerates a greater degree of vagueness in civil statutes than in criminal
statutes.”); id. at ¶ 44 (“vagueness challenges to statutes which do not
involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in the light of the
facts of the case at hand”).
22.

Br. Opp. at 28.
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ever requested disclosures or discovery or objected to the admission into
evidence of any emails or text messages that were not previously
disclosed. There is simply no basis for the argument that adjudicating a
fraud on the court through the mechanism of contempt would raise
legitimate due process concerns.
D. The district court made sufficient findings.
Finally, Ron argues that the district court did not make sufficient
findings for contempt to be sustained under the interpretation of
Subsection (4) Holly endorses:
The problem is that Holly never presented the lower courts with
the issue of whether Ron engaged “in a deliberate course of
deception to obtain a court order” or otherwise interfered with the
administration of justice, as typically required by the fraud of the
court doctrine. Instead, without invoking the statute, she only
argued that Ron misrepresented that he “had theretofore paid his
$14,951.11 share of the tax debt under . . . the Mediation
Settlement Agreement.” Likewise, the district court did not make
specific findings that would support such a conclusion.23

This is incorrect. The district court found that the parties agreed in
their mediation agreement to each pay one half of their tax debt, that Ron
induced Holly to enter into a stipulation requiring her to pay remaining
tax liabilities while concealing that he had not paid his half as he
previously agreed to, and he thus knowingly and intentionally misled
Holly about his failure to pay the taxes he agreed to pay.24 These findings
23.

Br. Opp. at 38.

24.

R. at 1132–34.
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are adequate to reach the ultimate conclusion that the Ron committed
fraud on the court by deceiving or concealing relevant facts from Holly
that hindered her ability to present her case.25 Moreover, it does not
appear that this argument was preserved or raised below, and is therefore
not properly before the Court.

II. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
BECAUSE THE PROPER INTERPRETATION OF SUBSECTION (4) WAS NOT
PROPERLY BEFORE IT.
In Point II of her opening brief, Holly explained that the issue of the
proper interpretation of Subsection (4) was neither preserved in the lower
court or raised in Ron’s opening brief, that there were no exceptions that
applied to allow the Court of Appeals to raise the issue sua sponte, and
that even if there were, the procedural requirements for raising the issue
were not followed, making the Court of Appeals’ decision improper and
reversible error.
In response, Ron first argues that he preserved the issue by
“challeng[ing] the trial court’s authority to hold him in contempt or grant
the specific relief sought by Holly.”26 In support of this argument, he cites
Patterson v. Patterson for the position that a party may raise controlling
authority for the first time with the appellate court as long as that

25.

Kartchner v. Kartchner, 2014 UT App 195, ¶ 27, 334 P.3d 1.

26.

Br. Opp. at 41.
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authority bears on a properly preserved issue.27 However, Ron reads the
exception in Patterson far too broadly—while Ron may not have had to
raise the statute with the district court or the Court of Appeals, he had to
at least raise the issue that his conduct he was found to have committed
did not constitute contemptible deceit or fraud as a matter of law in order
for the issue to be “presented to the district court in such a way that the
court has an opportunity to rule on it.”28 To rule otherwise would allow a
party to bootstrap all manner of new questions of law on appeal simply by
generally challenging the district court’s authority to enter an order.
Ron also argues that “no waiver occurred on appeal” because the
issue of whether the district court’s order holding Ron in contempt was
justified under Subsection (4) was “raised in Holly’s brief,” to which he
“simply responded” in his reply brief as this Court approved of in Brown
v. Glover.29 However, as Holly explained in her opening brief, the rule in
Brown allowing an appellant to respond to an argument for the first time
in its reply brief only applies when the appellee raises an alternate
ground for affirmance in its response brief—not, as in this case, an
argument used by the court of appeals to reverse the decision of the
district court.30 Rather than address this limitation to the rule in Brown

27.

Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 UT 68, ¶ 11, 266 P.3d 828.

28.

Id. at ¶ 12.

29.

Br. Opp. at 43 n.14.

30.

Opening Br. at 29–30.
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in his brief, Ron ignores it and simply repeats the argument made in a
previous submission to this Court.31
Ron next argues that exceptional circumstances apply to excuse the
preservation requirement—namely, that he “had little reason to analyze
the applicability of the statute . . . [as] Holly had not raised it as a basis
for relief.”32 However, as noted in her opening brief, Holly had alleged
fraud and misrepresentation as a basis for holding Ron in contempt.33 In
such a circumstance, there is no basis for finding exceptional
circumstances. Moreover, even if there were such a basis, in order to
excuse his failure to raise the issue before the Court of Appeals, Ron
would still have to show that “the issue is astonishingly erroneous but
undetected, the losing party would be subject to great and manifest
injustice, and neither party is unfairly prejudiced by raising the issue at
that point in the litigation.”34 Ron has not done made such a showing, and
it is unlikely that he could do so.
Finally, Ron argues that the “pure law” exception applies.35 As
explained in pages 27–28 of Holly’s opening brief, this argument fails for
two reasons: first, the exception’s third requirement that the unpreserved
issue “is necessary to correctly determine an issue that was properly
31.

See Opening Br. at 29 n.108.

32.

Br. Opp. at 45.

33.

Opening Br. at 7–8.

34.

State v. Johnson, 2017 UT 76, ¶ 49, 416 P.3d 443.

35.

Br. Opp. at 45–46.
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raised” does not apply. Ron’s only argument in response to this is that it
was necessary to reach the scope of Subsection (4) to determine whether
the district court had authority to hold a party in contempt absent a
showing that the party had willfully failed to follow a court order. This
response shows the problem with preservation in this case—if all that is
required to preserve an issue of law is a general argument that the Court
lacks authority, the preservation requirement is rendered meaningless.
The Court should therefore reject this argument. Second, even if the pure
law exception applied, the Court of Appeals did not follow proper
procedure in reaching the issue, as Holly explained in page 28 of her
opening brief.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Holly asks that this Court reverse the
Court of Appeals’ decision in this matter and remand to the Court of
Appeals for further proceedings.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 8th day of January, 2020.

/S/ Stephen D. Spencer
Stephen D. Spencer
SPENCER LAW OFFICE, PLLC
Attorney for Petitioner
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and uses Century Schoolbook typeface in 13-point font. According to
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excluding the caption, table of contents, table of authorities, certificate of
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